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Statement of the Case
Response to Whipple's statement concerning the course of
proceedings and disposition in court below
The Appellant, Aspen, (hereinafter "Aspen") takes exception to the following statements
contained in Appellee's (hereafter "Whipple") brief:
(1) Whipple contends that it hired a contractor who evaluated the heating system (HVAC)
pursuant to Judge Brian's ruling and found some minor "finish" work which needed to be completed.
Whipple further contends that the HVAC system would have been completed had it not been
dismissed from the job by Aspen and that the system would otherwise have been compliant and
satisfactory. (This statement implies that even though Whipple lacked proper licensure Whipple had
a right to complete the HVAC work. Aspen expressly rejects the implied premise within this
statement.) In addition, Whipple alleges that Aspen never had anyone look at the system as ordered
by Judge Brian. (Page 5 Appellee's brief) With regards to these statements, Aspen respectfully
makes the following observations: First there is no supporting citation in the record to support these
propositions and Aspen believes a review of the record would provide no support. Second, the
testimony of Anthony Neeley, Aspen's HVAC expert, is to the contrary. He inspected the system
as ordered by the court and there were substantial problems which he felt needed to be repaired, in
fact he recommended the complete removal of the three furnace systems. (Record 263)
(2) Whipple impliedly represents [page 6 of Appellee's brief] that Mr. Kent Whipple was
designated as an HVAC expert witness in its Answers to Interrogatories. In the discovery responses
Kent Whipple was never identified as having any HVAC license or special HVAC expertise and was
only identified as a "journeyman plumber" who would provide "testimony as to the quality of
workmanship and operation of the plumbing and heating work that they had inspected and are familiar
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with and were expected to provide testimony concerning the ability and qualifications of A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing and Heating to perform the services provided." (See Record 218, 219 in Answer
to Aspen's Interrogatory #8.)
(3) Whipple represents (page 7 Appellee's brief) that Whipple's counsel argued that "evidence
of the liens had been filed ... since the liens were public record" and he (Whipple's counsel) asked
the court pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to take judicial notice of the same.
Counsel refers to a final summation on page 70; however, a copy of the closing argument was not
transcribed to Aspen's counsel's knowledge, nor has one been provided to Aspen's counsel. In any
event, simply because a document is also a "public record" does not exempt it from the normal rules
of evidence, i.e., to have the document authenticated and properly admitted during the trial, which
was not done in this case.

Dispute with Whipple's Statement of Facts
Counsel for the Appellant also takes exception with paragraph 10, page 14 of the Statement
of Facts, specifically the last sentence in which Whipple claims "Kevin Monson and R. Lynn Padan
came to Fenstermaker and offered to pay him directly if he made the larger invoice disappear." The
trial court'sfindingon this point was opposite and any citation to a portion of the trial transcript to
support this allegation, which was strongly disputed at trial, is improper as it attacks afindingof the
trial court, without first marshalling the facts.

Summary of Argument
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted Whipple4 s motion for a new trial
on the stated grounds of "in the interests of justice." This error was not simply "harmless" but
substantially prejudiced Aspen. Without the lien evidence, which was introduced for thefirsttime
at the post-trial hearing in September 1996, there was no evidentiary basis on which the trial court
2

couldfindthe necessary statutory elements to order "foreclosure" of a mechanics' lien. The court
had already entered its decision on November 30, 1995, and it was improper for the court to reopen
the matter to take additional testimony where the trial court specifically found (albeit by negative
implication) that none of the other specific grounds set forth in Rule 59(a)(l)-(7)U.R.C.P. existed.
Both parties argue in their respective briefs that following the trial the evidence was
inadequate to support the trial court's judgment granting any foreclosure action of the mechanics'
liens. However, the parties differ in their interpretation of what legal effect this has. Whipple believes
because the evidence was inadequate, this supports its argument that independent grounds existed
for the court to grant a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(4)U.R.C.P.; and therefore, the error
(infindingthe grounds "in the interests of justice") was harmless. Aspen believes that Whipple's
reliance on Rule 59(a)(4) U.R.C.P. is misplaced and that Rule 59(a)(4) is completely inapplicable
under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, it being conceded there is an inadequate evidentiary
basis, it was error for the trial court to order foreclosure of the mechanics' liens— at most all the trial
court could have entered was a monetary judgment
Whipple's interpretation of Judge Brian's ruling, granting Aspen's motion to dismiss as to the
HVAC claim, is also incorrect. Once Judge Brian granted the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff legally
failed to prevail on the mechanics' lien foreclosure action with respect to the HVAC work and
therefore Aspen was entitled to attorney's fees on this portion of the lien claim. §38-1-18 U.C. A.
Having ruled that §58-55-604 U.C. A was controlling, it was error for Judge Brian to allow equitable
recovery for the HVAC work in clear disregard of the state statute. The common law exception
discussed in the briefs of both parties was inapplicable because Judge Brian, after applying the multifactor test, specifically found the statute to be controlling.
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The trial court's evidentiary rulings had the cumulative effect of denying Aspen a fair trial.
Kent Whipple should never have been allowed to testify as an HVAC expert, as it was clear he did
not have the requisite licensing or the expertise at the beginning of the trial, nor was he disclosed as
an HVAC expert during discovery. Basic concepts of fairness let alone the Rules of Civil Procedure
require timely disclosure, if Kent Whipple was going to testify as an HVAC expert. The Rules of
Civil Procedure envision an on-going obligation to notify the other party in the event their answers
become misleading or incomplete, which is what occurred in this case.

I
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted
Whipple's Motion for a New Trial on the stated grounds that it was
"in the interests of justice" and said error was substantial—not
harmless.
On page 21 of the Appellee's brief Whipple concedes that the trial court may have committed
error when it granted Whipple's motion for a new trial1 on grounds which were not expressly
provided for in Rule 59 U.R.C.P. However, Whipple claims that such error was "harmless" because
independent grounds existed under subparagraph (4) which in pertinent part provides: " . . .
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law."
Aspen respectfully submits that Whipple's counsel miscomprehends the purpose and intent
of subparagraph (4). Subparagraph (4) is not available to a party to buttress their case in post-trial
proceedings. The normal and usual application of subparagraph (4) is in the context of a jury trial
not a judge tried matter such as this case. In order to understand the import of subparagraph (4) one
must understand the context in which the rule evolved. The "Compiler's Note" to Rule 59 U.R.C.P.

'Throughout the briefs both parties have made reference to the court granting Whipple's motion for a new trial There was, in fact,
no "new trial" in the sense that both parties started from the beginning. What occurred was the Plaintiff Whipple was allowed to put
into evidence the liens and other documents evidencing compliance with the mailing requirement under §38-1-7 UCA which then
provided the trial court with the requisite evidentiary basis to find the statutory elements of a lien foreclosure action.
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states that this rule is similar to Rule 59 F.R.C.P.; however, that is not entirely correct. Rule 59
F.R.C.P. is much more broad in the scope and discretion accorded to the trial court. (A copy of the
federal counterpart is attached hereto as addendum 1 to this brief.) Both the Moore's Federal
Practice and the Wright, Miller & Kane treatises on federal practice note that in the federal courts
there is a definite distinction between a motion to reopen (which is made prior to the trial court
issuing its ruling or the jury rendering a verdict) and a motion for a new trial which is made following
the decision of the trial court or the verdict by the jury. As a basic proposition, subdivision (4), which
allows the court to grant a new trial where the evidence is "insufficient to justify the verdict or other
decision or that it is against the law," creates a standard for the trial judge to apply in assessing a
jury's verdict, i.e., whether or not the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or against
the law. Volume 12(a) Moore 's Federal Practice. §59.13 [2] In actions tried without a jury, a new
trial may not be granted merely because one party may be able to present a better case in another trial.
See Volume 12(a) Moore's FederalPractice, §59.13 See also In Re Knaus. 47 B.R. 63 (Bank. Mo
1985); In Re DuvaltMfg. Co., 4 B.R 382 (Bank. Pa 1980); Brown v. Wright 588 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.
1978); Kirby v. U.S.. 297 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1961); Aerated Products Co. ofL.A. v. Aeration
Process, 95 F. Supp. 23 (D.C. Cal 1950)
Whipple's argument that subdivision (4) allows a party, who has failed to present sufficient
evidence during trial, the opportunity to make a motion for new trial to buttress their case in post
trial proceedings is nonsensical. Such an interpretation of subdivision (4) literally creates an
exception which would swallow up the rule. It would result in unnecessary delay and wasted effort
by the court and counsel, as was the result in this case.2 In essence, it would create a standard with

The post-trial portion of the trial record exceeds the pre-trial portion by almost threefold and took over a year following
trial, which concluded November 30,1995, to complete.
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no predictable outcome and each motion for a new trial would turn solely on the particulars of the
judicial personalities involved in hearing the creative grounds in support of the moving parties' motion
for the new trial. Application of such a rule, as observed by Judge Stewart, "would fatally undermine
the essential judicial concepts of stability and finality of judgments and make justice almost wholly
a question of the vicissitudes of judicial personality." (In Re: Knaus p. 65)
There must be an end to litigation someday and free, calculated, and deliberate choices of how
to try one's case are not to be relieved from lightly. In this case, Whipple failed to introduce any
written evidence of the three separate mechanics' liens or lis pendens. (Again this case is in fact three
consolidated cases and no independent evidence exists as to each of the three properties as to which
foreclosure was sought.) Whipple effectively conceded, when it filed its motion for a new trial, that
there was insufficient evidence to sustain an order of lien foreclosure. Counsel for Aspen indicated
that an appeal was likely and in effort to bolster its case Whipple filed the motion for a new trial
which the trial court improperly granted. If this Court adopts Whipple's argument that Subdivision
(4) applies under the circumstances presented in this case, it creates a rule of law that can only lead
to further confusion and endless litigation.
Standard of Review. On page 23 of its brief, Whipple asserts that Aspen must show that
the error was "substantial and prejudicial" and not merely harmless. Contrary to what Whipple states
in its brief, it is a self-evident principle that without the written (documented) evidence of a
mechanics' lien having been filed there is no evidentiary basis to support an order of foreclosure--at
most all the trial court could have granted was a monetary judgment. Whipple's argument is
unpersuasive, particularly in light of the fact that a mechanics' foreclosure action is statutory in
nature, and it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to place into the trial record evidence of each of the
elements necessary to show statutory compliance. See Projects Unlimited. Inc. v. Cooper State

6

Thrift & Loan. 798 P.2d. 738, 743, 745 (Utah 1998); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development &
Energy Co.. 714 P.2d. 289, 291-292 (Utah 1986).
Prior to the court granting the motion for a new trial, there is absolutely no evidence showing
compliance with the mechanics' lien foreclosure statute as required in AAA Fencing. Whipple, in
support of its proposition that the record does show compliance with Section 38-1-7 U.C.A., cites
this Court to pages 536-549 of the record; however, this portion of the record is the September 1996
post-trial hearing which occurred after the trial court granted Whipple's motion for a new trial.
Counsel for Whipple is correct when he states on page 24 of Whipple's brief that Aspen fails to
l

acknowledge this portion of the record, because this portion of the record was created following
the motion for a new trial, not during the trial. Since Aspen's position is the motion for the new trial
should not have been granted (because there were no grounds to allow such), Aspen does not
concede that it is proper to consider that such evidence forms a part of the trial record which Whipple
can rely upon that it has proved its statutory lien during trial In fact, by citing only to this portion
of the record, Whipple effectively concedes that the lien was not proven during the trial, which is
consistent with Aspen's counsel's attempt to marshall the evidence.

II
There is no basis to award attorney's fees particularly as such
relates to the prosecution of any equitable portion of the HVAC work
At page 27 of its brief) Whipple concedes that the "equitable value of the heating system" is
included in the amount which Whipple is seeking to foreclose. Since Judge Brian granted Aspen's
motion to dismiss the lien action with regards to the HVAC work, any amount attributable to an
"equitable" recovery cannot, as a matter of law, be included in any statutory mechanics' lien order

7

of foreclosure. What else could be the legal effect of granting the motion to dismiss? Whipple's
argument on this issue is simply illogical.
Whipple contends on page 28 of its brief that it recovered on two causes of action: " in
equity" and for "unjust enrichment." Neither of these actions were pled3 nor do either of these
actions allow for the recovery of attorney's fees. The only cause of action contained in the complaint
was for the recovery of a mechanics' lien claim. In Foote v. Clark. 347 UAR 36, 37 (Utah 1998) the
Utah Supreme Court reiterated the controlling principle:
Generally, attorney's fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter ofrightunder
a contract or statute. (See Cabrera v. CotreL 694 P.2d. 622, 625 (Utah
1985); but see Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission. 885 P.2d. 759,
782-83 (Utah 1994). (Awarding fees under this court's equitable power in
original proceedings challenging telephone rate increase where petitioner
acted as a private attorney general.)
Although Plaintiff Whipple cites this Court to the case of Stewart v. Utah Public Service
Commission, this dispute does not involve an original proceeding and adoption of a rule allowing
open-ended application of the "equity" exception recognized in Stewart would essentially obliterate
the general rule. See also Foote v. Clark, supra p. 38 where the Court states succinctly the following:
In this regard we have mandated that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee
request according to its underlying claims: See Cottonwood Mall. 830 P.2d.
at 269-70 (Utah 1992). Indeed the party must categorize the time and fees
expended for "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney's fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an
entitlement to attorney's fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims
for which there is no entitlement to attorney's fees."
Whipple's statement on page 28 that the trial court did not err in failing to award defendant's
attorney's fees because the record clearly indicates the defendant did not successfully defend against
the HVAC lien is simply wrong. This statement ignores the law of the case doctrine and the clear

Aspen fs counsel is cognizant of the fact that under Rule 15(b) URCP the pleadings may be amended virtually at any stage
of the proceedings to do justice. See Rule 15 URCP; Archuleta v. Huzhes 353 17 (1998). However no oral or written motion was ever
made to accomplish this.
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import of Judge Brian's ruling, which granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of the
lien claim.
Ill
The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
Kent Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert.
Whipple's counsel indicates that any objection to having Kent Whipple testify as an HVAC
expert was waived because Aspen's counsel failed to preserve it for appeal. Aspen's counsel
respectfully disagrees. In the total context of the trial (where Whipple had rested its case and was
defending the adequacy of the HVAC system in relationship to Aspen's counterclaims) it is clear that
the trial court was well aware the testimony that Kent Whipple intended to introduce dealt only with
the HVAC system. When Kent Whipple was called to the stand during the second phase of the trial,
it was improper for the trial court to have allowed him to testify as to the adequacy of the HVAC
system when all that was ever disclosed in discovery was that he was a "journeyman plumber."
Whipple concedes that Aspen's counsel pointed this out to the trial judge (see record page 1550) but
asserts that Aspen's counsel waived such by failing to continually object.
First, the purpose of the requirement for stating the objection is to put the court on notice.
The Rules of Evidence require that to preserve an objection, a party must object with specificity, or
else the party waives the objection. Rule 103(aXl) U.RE.; Salt Lake City v. Holtman. 806 P.2d. 235
(Ut . App. 1991). Given the context in which Aspen's counsel raised his concerns, Whipple's
argument of waiver is unpersuasive. Was the trial court apprised of the problem? The only answer,
given the trial judge's substantial experience, education and training, is yes, he was. Second, the
purpose of the appellate court is to make sure that there is a uniform application of the rules and
consistency in the law. Willevv. Willev. 951 P.2d. 226, 230 (Utah 1997). Under the circumstances,
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if counsel intended to utilize Mr. Kent Whipple's testimony in the capacity as an HVAC expert, he
was obligated under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to state such clearly or in the alternative to
supplement the response if the response at the time it was made was incomplete or otherwise
misleading. See Rules 26(e) and 37 U.R.C.P. The failure to disclose that Kent Whipple would be
called as an HVAC expert made Whipple's responses to discovery incomplete and evasive. Given
the fact that the trial set of discovery served prior to the trial (July 23, 1995-Record 122, 124) was
never answered, nor was Judge Brian's pretrial order complied with (Record 122), the incomplete
responses compounded the problem which under the circumstances was misleading and unfairly
prejudicial to Aspen. Aspen timely sought a motion in limine to prevent such a surprise. (Record
122) When Aspen's counsel pointed out that the only qualification Kent Whipple had was as a
"journeyman plumber," the trial court should not have allowed testimony from a person not otherwise
qualified to render an "expert" opinion. See Rules 701 and 702 U.R.E.

IV
When Judge Brian granted the motion to dismiss the HVAC claim,
any further recovery, whether termed equitable or
legal, was barred by the statute.
Aspen's counsel respectfully suggests that, distilled down to it's simplest form, Whipples'
argument on this point is contrary to express legislative policy: 1) The primary goal behind enactment
of the Construction Trades Licensing Act is to protect the publicfrominept tradesman. 2) The Trial
Court determined that the HVAC system was defective. (Record 263) 3) This should end the
argument over the application of the "common law exception." No matter how long Whipple has
been doing something illegally does not justify the illegal action, particularly when Aspen was harmed.
On page 16 of the Appellee's brie£ Whipple's counsel sets out the activities which a licensed
general plumbing contractor is permitted to engage in. Whipple places emphasis on the wording
10

"provision of a safe and adequate supply of gases for lighting, heating, and industrial purposes."
Counsel for Aspen would simply observe that allowing a plumber to pipe a gas supply for a heating
system does not give carte blanc authority for a plumber to engage in the installation of a forced air
heating system, an activity for which a separate license is required.4 Such reasoning would
completely emasculate the need for an HVAC license, which is illogical. Counsel would further point
out that on page 16 Whipple makes an unsupported allegation concerning insurance which is very
material. Whipple alleges that it maintains liability insurance which protected Whipple's customers
against any errors or omissions which might occur as a result of its installation of an improper heating
system at 77 Thaynes Canyon. Although counsel cites pages 64-70 of the trial court record, there
is no support for this allegation, by affidavit or otherwise, such as providing a copy of said insurance.
Whipple's allegation is simply unsupported in the record as a whole.
Consequently, what Whipple argues is that an unlicensed contractor, one who candidly
admits, (page 18, Appellee's Brief) that it has actively engaged in the installation of forced air heating
systems for more than 16 years and has simply gotten away with it without obtaining the proper
HVAC license should be entitled to recover when it installs a defective heating system,
notwithstanding the legislature's clear intent concerning licensing this type of activity. This is not a
case where a contractor once properly licensed, inadvertently allowed its license to lapse. Whipple
was never licensed to do HVAC work. Nor is it a situation where there are no complaints concerning
the work performed without being properly licensed. Whether or not Whipple's counsel wishes to
mitigate the extent of the heating system deficiencies, the fact of the matter is the heating system was
found by the trial court after a four-day trial to have certain defects (Record 263). Whipple's counsel
would have this court completely ignore the fact that the system was found to be defective, that
4

See Addendum 3 to this brief for the complete text of Rule 156-55a Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act Rules,
particularly those concerning specialty license category S340 and S350.
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litigation unnecessarily ensued, and had Aspen known that Whipple was not properly licensed, Padan
would not have hired Whipple to install the HVAC system. (See paragraph D, page 3 of Padan's
affidavit, appendix 5). Whipple asserts that its failure to understand its licensing requirement was a
result of a good faith misunderstanding. This position is not supported by the record nor recognized
by Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. "It is important to note that the
licensee is responsible to know and understand the law regulating his or her licensed profession." See
page 16, Utah State Bar Journal Volume 11, No. 8, October 1998
Aspen's counsel concedes that application of the common law exception normally requires
a multi-factored test, but under the circumstances Whipple is not entitled to the benefit of the
common law exception. Given the circumstances presented by this case, Judge Brian's ruling
granting the motion to dismiss was proper and as a result, having once entered the order that "§5855-604 U.C.A. was controlling" in this case, the trial court was obligated to strictly enforce the
legislative mandate contained in §58-55-604 U.C.A..

CONCLUSION
The appellate courts are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring legal accuracy and
uniformity of the laws of this state. Willevv. Willev. 951 P.2d. 226, 230 (Utah 1997).
Aspen asks the Court of Appeals to take the following action:
1.

Reverse the trial court's order granting Whipple's motion for a new trial.

2.

Reverse the trial court's order of foreclosure and vacate the order granting
attorney fees and costs to Whipple.

3.

Reverse the trial court's order allowing Whipple equitable recovery as to the
HVAC system.

4.

Remand the case to the presiding judge of the Third District for assignment
to a judge who has not previously tried the case.

5.

Remand the case with instructions to enter a monetary judgment in favor of
Whipple as found by the trial court, without the equitable recovery for the HVAC
claim. ($3,943.00 + $7,000.00 - $9,173.00)

6.

Remand the case with instructions to the Trial Court that Whipple failed to
prevail on its mechanics' lien claims and to grant Aspen's attorneys fees and costs
incurred at the trial and on appeal and to hold an evidentiary hearing on the proper
amount of attorney fees and costs consistent with the principles set forth in Foote v.
Clark* supra.

7.

Remand the case with such other instructions as the court deems necessary
and proper.

Respectfully submitted this£j£? day of November, 1998.
HARRIS, PRES

defendant/Appellant

(original signature)
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CIVIL RULE

Rule 59.

New Trials; Amendment of Judgments.

(a) GROUNDS. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been
a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States; and (2)
in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which
rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts
of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without
a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment.
(b) TIME FOR MOTION. Any motion for a new trial shall be filed no
later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
(c) TIME FOR SERVING AFFIDAVITS. When a motion for new trial is
based on affidavits, they shall be filed with the motion. The opposing
party has 10 days after service to file opposing affidavits, but that period
may be extended for up to 20 days, either by the court for good cause
or by the parties' written stipulation. The court may permit reply
affidavits.
(d) ON COURT'S INITIATIVE-, NOTICE; SPECIFYING GROUNDS. NO later
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court, on its own, may order
a new trial for any reason that would justify granting one on a party's
motion. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard,
the court may grant a timely motion for a new trial for a reason not stated
in the motion. When granting a new trial on its own initiative or for a
reason not stated in a motion, the court shall specify the grounds in its
order.
(e) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT. Any motion to alter or
amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment. [Adopted 1937; last amended 1995.]

(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc)
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SYNOPSIS
A.

OVERVIEW OF RULE

§ 59.01

Text of Rule 59

§ 59.02

Function of Rule

§ 59.03

Procedural Nature of Rule

§ 59.04

Constitutional Considerations

§ 59.05

Coordination With Other Rules
[I]

Time Computation Under Rule 6
[a] Weekends and Holidays Excluded
[b] Three-Day Mail Extension Prohibited
[c] Court Extensions Prohibited
[2] Postjudgment Amendment of Complaint Under Rule 15(a)
[3] Separate Trials Under Rule 42(b)
[4] Special Verdicts, General Verdicts, and Interrogatories Under
Rule 49
[5] Judgment as a, Matter of Law Under Rule 50
[6] Amended or Additional Findings of Fact in Court Actions
Under Rule 52
[7] Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60
[a] Correction of Clerical Errors
[b] Relief From Judgment
[8] Harmless Error Under Rule 61
[9] Stays of Execution Under Rule 62(b)
[10] Inability of Judge to Proceed Under Rule 63
[II] Rule 71A Eminent Domain
[12] Applicability of Rule 59 to Special Proceedings; Bankruptcy
§§ 59.06-59.09 Reserved
B. NEW TRIALS
§ 59.10

Procedure for New Trial
[1]

(Matthew Bender ft Co., Inc.)

Motion Required by Party; Grounds Stated With Particularity
(Rel. 116-12/97

Pub 410)
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MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

[2]
[3]
§ 59.11

Court Can Grant on Own Initiative
Court May Enlarge Issues

Time Limits
[1]

[2]

[3]
[4]

Motion For New Trial
[a] Ten Days After Entry Of Judgment
[b] Motion Before Entry Of Judgment
When Court Acts on Own Initiative
[a] Ten Days After Entry of Judgment
[b] Longer Period When Proper New Trial Motion Pending
Entry of Judgment Defined
When Late Motion May be Treated as Rule 60 Motion
r

[a]
[b]
§ 59.12

Effect of Motion on Time for Appeal
[1]
[2]

§ 59.13

?

Correction of Clerical Error Under Rule 60(a)
Motion for Relief From Judgment Under Rule 60(b)

Timely Motion
Untimely Motion
[a] No Tolling of Time for Appeal
[b] Doctrine of Unique Circumstances May Permit Late
Filing
[c] Excusable Neglect May Permit Late Filing of Appeal

Grounds for New Trial
[1]
[2]

(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)

No Fixed Standard For Rule 59 Relief
Jury Trial
[a] Reasonable Basis Test
[b] Judicial Error or Misconduct
[i] Legal Errors
, [A] Prejudice Required
[B] Jury Instructions
[C] Jury Trial Issues
[D] Inadequate Findings and Conclusions
[E] Evidentiary Rulings
[ii] Misconduct
[c] Misconduct of Counsel, Parties, and Witnesses
[i] Misconduct of Counsel
(Rel 116-12/97

Pub 410)
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NEW TRIAL
[A] Proof Requirements
[B] Prejudicial Misconduct
[C] Timely Objection Ordinarily Required
[D] Court Instructions May Cure Harm
[ii] Misconduct of Parties
[iii] Misconduct of Witnesses
[d] Newly Discovered Evidence
[i] Relationship to Rule 60(b) Motions
[ii] Three-part Analysis
[iii] Evidence Available After Judgment
[iv] New Evidence Must be Admissible and
Probative
[v] Evidence Not Cumulative or Impeaching
[vi] Burden of Proof
[vii] Bases for Denial of Motion
Jury Issues
[i] Selection
[ii] Bias or Disqualification
[iii] Misconduct of Jury
[A] Compromise; Coercion; Absence of
Verdict Unanimity
[B] Access to Inappropriate Information
[C] Independent Investigation; Outside
Influence
[D] Proof of Misconduct
[f] Verdict Issues
[i] Verdict Upheld if Justifiable
[ii] Inconsistency of General and Special Verdicts
and Interrogatories
[A] Verdicts'Inconsistent With Each Other
or With Interrogatories
[B] Answers to Interrogatories Internally
Inconsistent
[iii] Verdict Against Clear Weight of Evidence
[A] Role of Judge
[B] Applicable Standard Unclear
[g] Damage Issues
[i] New Trial When Verdict Entirely
Disproportionate to Injury

(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc )

(Rel 116-12/97
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[ii]

[3]

[4]
[5]
§ 59.14

Grounds for Partial New Trial
[1]
[2]
[3]

§ 59.15

[3]

Supporting Affidavits Filed With Motion; Extension
Opposing Affidavits to be Filed Within 10 Days After Service;
Extension
Court May Permit Reply Affidavits

Amendment of Motion for New Trial
[1]
[2]

§ 59.17

Jury Trials
Court Trials
Effect on Time for Appeal

Time for Serving Affidavits
[1]
[2]

§ 59.16

Inadequate Damages; Additur
[A] "Additur" Defined
[B] Additur is Constitutionally
Impermissible
[C] Current Use of Additur
[iii] Excessive Damages; Remittitur
[A] Court May Grant New Trial or
Condition Denial on Acceptance of
Remittitur
[B] "Shocks Conscience" Standard in
Federal Question Cases
[C] State Standards Apply in Diversity
Cases
[D] Amount of Remittitur
[E] Agreement to Remittitur Precludes
Subsequent Appeal of Remittitur Order
Actions Without Jury
[a] Grounds Similar to Jury Trial Bases
[b] Effect of Motion
[c] Motion to Reopen Distinguished
Insufficient Grounds
New Trial for Less Than All Parties

Within 10-Day Period
After 10-day Period

Notice and Opportunity to be Heard

f (Matthew Bender St Co., Inc.)
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court determined that the trial court's finding of excusable neglect was entitled
to deference and affirmed the district court's extension.13
For further discussion of the doctrine of excusable neglect, see Chapter 6, Time.
§ 59.13

Grounds for New Trial

[ l ] _ N o Fixed Standard For Rule 59 Relief
No fixed standard applies to the grant or denial of Rule 59 relief; rather, the
applicable standard applied by the trial court in its exercise of discretion varies
with the grounds for which relief is sought. l The general grounds for a new trial
are that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, that,the damages
are excessive, that the trial was,not fair, or that substantial errors occurred in
the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions.2
Further, a district court has broad discretion to grant a new trial when necessary
to prevent injustice.3 These bases are discussed in [2] (jury trials) and [3] (court
trials), below; insufficient grounds are discussed in [4], below,
[2]—Jury Trial
[a]—Reasonable Basis Test
As a general rule, courts will not disturb jury verdicts in the absence of extreme
circumstances, such as a case of manifest injustice or abuse of the jury's function.
Courts will sustain jury verdicts if reasonable bases exist to uphold the verdict.
In ruling on a Rule 59 motion, the court will search the record for evidence that
could reasonably lead the jury to reach its verdict, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the verdict winner.4
13

Deference to trial court'sfindingof neglect. Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909
F.2d 1557, 1563-1564 (7th Cir. 1990) (appellate court deferred to trial court's finding of excusable
neglect but would overturn if excuse is frivolous; opposition did not challenge finding).
1
Applicable standard varies depending on basis for motion. Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands
Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (D.V.I. 1995) (standard varies depending on basis for Rule 59 motion).
2
General grounds for new trial. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251,
61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147 (1940) (non-exclusive list of grounds for new trial includes against
weight of evidence, excessive judgriient, and trial unfair); Kowalski v. American S.S. Co., 954
F. Supp. 140, 142-144 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
3 Prevent injustice. Government fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Flores, 981 R2d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 1993).
4
Reasonable basis test Nissim y. McNeil Consumer Prods. Co., 957 F. Supp. 600, 602-604
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (motioh challenging jury verdict denied because court could not conclude that
verdict so inconsistent with evidence as to constitute, manifest injustice in light of evidence and
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)

(Rel.l 16-12/97 * Pub.410)
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time of the trial despite due diligence to learn about the facts of the case
(see [iii], below).
• The evidence discovered must be of a nature that would probably change
the outcome of the case (see [iv], below).
• The evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching (see [v],
below).
[iii]—Evidence Available After Judgment
A motion for new
of newly discovered
judgment, 37 and the
the time of the trial
of the case. 38

trial under Rule 59(a) may properly be based on the ground
evidence. 36 The evidence must have been discovered after
movant must have been excusably ignorant of the facts at
despite due diligence in an effort to learn about the facts

36 Newly discovered evidence.

37

1st Circuit

Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (decision to grant or
deny in trial court's discretion; when much direct evidence is newly
available, motion should be granted because second jury could better
determine issues); see Superchi v. Town of Athol, 170 F.R.D. 3, 5 (D.
Mass. 1996) (newly discovered evidence must be admissible and potentially
affect the jury's verdict or court judgment).

2d Circuit

White v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1987) (evidence available
three weeks before judgment is not newly discovered evidence).

5th Circuit

Government Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995)
(only exception to rule of nonappealability is when motion is based on
newly discovered evidence).

Evidence discovered after judgment.
5th Circuit

Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997)
(reversal requires clear abuse of discretion); see Government Fin. Servs.
v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 775 (5th Cir. 1995) (movant must be
excusably ignorant of newly discovered evidence at time of trial).

10th Circuit

Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (evidence clearly
available during trial albeit unknown to movant is insufficient; movant must
show that evidence discovered since trial).

38

Excusable ignorance despite due diligence. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261
U.S. 399,419-422,43 S. Ct. 458,67 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1922) (party seeking new trial must be excusably
unaware of existence of evidence during trial).
1st Circuit

(Mailhew Bender & C o . Inc)

D. Federico Co. v. New Bedford Redevelopment Auth., 723 F.2d 122, 130
(1st Cir. 1983) (citing Moore's, holding that movant must be excusably
unaware of existence of evidence during trial); Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New
England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 825 (1st Cir.), cert denied,
(Rel 116-12/97
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[d]—Newly Discovered Evidence
[i]—Relationship to Rule 60(b) Motions
A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made
under Rule 59 or Rule 60(b). If the motion is brought under Rule 60(b), it may
be made within one year of entry of judgment; 32 a motion made under Rule
59 is governed by the shorter 10-day filing period. 33 Because the Rule 59 filing
period is so limited, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
are usually made under Rule 60(b), provided the other requirements of that rule
are satisfied. However, if the new evidence is discovered (or by due diligence
could have been discovered) in time to move under Rule 59(b), the movant is
subject to the time limitations of Rule 59. 3 4
For further discussion of the interaction between these two rules, see
§ 59.05[7]; for additional coverage of the requirements imposed by Rule 60, see
Chapter 60, Relief From Judgment or Order,
[ii]—Three-part Analysis
A three-part analysis applies to motions for new trials based on newly
discovered evidence: 35
• The newly discovered evidence must have been discovered after judgment
and the movant must have been excusably ignorant of the facts at the
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
33

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).

34

Party subject to Rule 59 time limitations. Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50 (5th
Cir. 1992) (newly discovered evidence ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(2); evidence must be
material and controlling and clearly produce different result if presented before judgment).
5th Circuit

Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50 (5th Cir. 1992) (newly discovered
evidence ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(2); evidence must be material
and controlling and clearly produce different result if presented before
judgment).

7th Circuit

See Ball v. Chicago, 2 F.3d 752,760 (7th Cir. 1993) (post-judgment motion
made within 10 days deemed to be under Rule 59(e)).

35

Three-part analysis.
5th Circuit
10th Circuit

(Matthew Bender & Co , Inc )

Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997)
(reversal requires clear abuse of discretion).
Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (evidence clearly
available during trial albeit unknown to movant is insufficient; movant must
show 1) evidence was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court
may infer reasonable diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or
impeaching, and 4) evidence is material and likely to cause new result).
(Rel 116-12/97
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Facts known to a party during the pendency of the trial but not disclosed to
counsel until after the trial are not considered to be newly discovered evidence
for purposes of Rule 59. 3 9
464 U.S. 894 (1983) (newly discovered evidence must be of type that would
not have been uncovered by diligent search).
2d Circuit

See Music Research, Inc. v. Vanguard Recording Soc, Inc., 547 F.2d 192,
196 (2d Cir. 1976) (no abuse to refuse proffered new evidence (public
record released before trial) when no reason that information could not
have been provided earlier).

5th Circuit

Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997)
(reversal requires clear abuse of discretion); see Government Fin. Servs.
v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995) (movant must be
excusably ignorant of newly discovered evidence at time of trial; after
movant filed to adequately show that it could not have discovered evidence
forming basis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) motion before or during trial
even with exercise of due diligence, movant may not prevail of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(a) motion based on same evidence); see Owens v. International
Paper Co., 528 F.2d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1976) (denial of Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a) motion affirmed because movants failed to make requisite showing
that they were excusably ignorant of newly discovered evidence until after
trial and had used reasonable diligence to obtain that evidence before trial).

7th Circuit

Roach v. Startny, 104 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1939) (evidence known to
party during trial is not new evidence despite failure to disclose to counsel
and party's ignorance of significance of evidence).

9th Circuit

Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, 833 F.2d 208, 211-212
(9th Cir. 1987) (evidence in movant's possession or could have been
discovered through reasonable diligence is not newly discovered evidence
for Rule 59 motion); Contempo Metal Furniture Co. v. East Texas Motor
Freight Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1981) (movant must show
that failed to discover evidence earlier; due diligence required); see Angco
v. Standard Oil Co., 66 F.2d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 1933) (abuse of discretion
to reopen).

10th Circuit

Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (evidence clearly
available during trial albeit unknown to movant is insufficient; movant must
show. 1) evidence Was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court
may infer reasonable diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or
impeaching, and 4) evidence is material and likely to cause new result).

39

Party's failure to disclose known facts until after trial. Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry,
110 F.3d 1147, 1154-1155 (5th Cir. 1997) (facts known to party during trial but not disclosed
to counsel until after trial are not newly discovered evidence).
5th Circuit

(Maithew Bender & Co., Inc.)

Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154-1155 (5th Cir.
1997) (facts known to party during trial but not disclosed to counsel until
after trial are not newly discovered evidence).
(Rel. 116-12/97
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[iv]—New Evidence Must be Admissible and Probative
To support a Rule 59 motion, the newly discovered evidence (see [iii], above)
must be both admissible and probative. Further, the evidence must potentially
affect the jury's verdict or the court's judgment. Stated differently, the evidence
must be of such substantial probative value that a different result would have
been attained if introduced at the original trial.40
[v]—Evidence Not Cumulative or Impeaching
To support a Rule 59 motion for a new trial, or a motion to amend, based
on newly discovered evidence, the new facts must represent something more than
merely cumulative or impeachment evidence.41 However, evidence of false
7th Circuit

Roach v. Stastny, 104 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1939) (evidence known to
party during trial is not new evidence despite failure to disclose to counsel
until after trial and party's ignorance of significance of evidence).
40
Evidence admissible and potentially affect judgment See Superchi v. Town of AthoL, 170
F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (D. Mass. 1996) (newly discovered evidence must be admissible and potentially
affect the jury's verdict or court judgment); see also WEINSTEINS FEDERAL EVIDENCE (Matthew
Bender 2d ed.).
1st Circuit
See Superchi v. Town of Athol, 170 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (D. Mass. 1996) (newly
discovered evidence must be admissible and potentially affect the jury's
verdict or court judgment).
5th Circuit
Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997)
(facts discovered must be of nature to probably change outcome of case);
Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1995) (new trial
motion properly denied when new evidence has limited probative value
and would be used primarily for impeachment; newly discovered evidence
in form of nonparty affidavit countering opposition testimony insufficient
because no guarantee jury would accept affidavit and reject opposition
testimony); Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1435-1436 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) (no clear abuse of discretion in denying
motion because false testimony could not have affected trial).
9th Circuit

Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, 833 F.2d 208, 211-212
(9th Cir. 1987) (evidence must be admissible and likely to affect judgment).
10th Circuit
Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (newly discovered
evidence must have real probative value, evidence that is material and likely
to cause new result)
41
Not cumulative or impeaching evidence. Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d
1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) (newly discovered evidence must be more than cumulative or
impeachment evidence).
5th Circuit
Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997)
(newly discovered evidence must be more than cumulative or impeachment
evidence); Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1995)
(Matthew Bender & Co.. Inc.)

(Rel. 116-12/97
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testimony by a witness may constitute sufficient grounds for a new trial if the
time requirements of newly discovered evidence (see [iii], above) and the
admissibility and probative requirements are satisfied (see [iv], above).*2
[vi]—Burden of Proof
The party making the Rule 59 motion has the burden of affirmatively proving
that the evidence on which the motion is based existed at the time of the trial
but was not discovered in time to use at the trial, although the party diligently
prepared for trial (see [iii], above). Additionally, the movant must allege the
nature of the evidence, showing that the evidence is admissible and probative,
that it is not merely cumulative, and will not be used primarily for impeachment.
Finally, the movant must convince the court that, if the evidence had been
introduced at the trial, a different result would have been reached (see [iv], [v],
above). The movant should supply whatever proof is available, such as affidavits
and documentary evidence, to support the motion. 43
[vii]—Bases for Denial of Motion
Evidence that was available and known during the trial, but that was not
submitted to the court, does not constitute sufficient grounds for a Rule 59
motion. 44 Similarly, evidence that supports a new legal theory of the case that
(new trial motion properly denied when new evidence, in form of nonparty
affidavit countering opposition testimony, insufficient because has limited
probative value and would be used primarily for impeachment).
10th Circuit

Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (movant must show
that evidence is neither cumulative or impeaching).

4

2 Evidence of false testimony. Phillips v.'Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 705
(4th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (abuse of trial court's discretion to credit
witness's testimony after proof was submitted that witness committed perjury, but court made no
attempt to determine extent of perjury).
4

3 Movant's burden of proof. Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (movant
must show 1) evidence was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court may infer reasonable
diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or impeaching, and 4) evidence is material and likely
to cause new result).
2d Circuit

Petition of Wetzien, 68 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).

10th Circuit

Morgan v, Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (movant must show
1) evidence* was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court may infer
reasonable diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or impeaching, and
4) evidence is material and likely to cause new result).

44

Evidence available during trial may not be basis for motion. Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, USA, 833 F.2d 208,1210-212 (9th Cir. 1987) (new trial motion may not be based
on evidence that was available during trial).
(Matthew Bender & C o , Inc)
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was not introduced at the original trial is not an adequate basis for a motion
for a new trial. 45 In this situation, the moving party should move to amend the
pleadings to add the new theory to the case and then move to reopen in order
to introduce additional relevant proof {see Ch. 60, Relief From Judgment or
Order; see also § 59.13[3][c]).
Evidence that is merely cumulative, or that is introduced solely to impeach,
is not proper grounds for a new trial under Rule 59. 4 6 However, evidence of
false testimony by a witness may constitute sufficient grounds for a new trial
if the requirements of newly discovered evidence are met. 47
[e]—Jury Issues
[i]—Selection
A new trial may properly be granted based on denial of peremptory challenges, 48 or on the systematic exclusion of a particular group from service on
45

Evidence supporting unused legal theory may not be basis of motion. Toops v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 871 F. Supp. 284, 294-295 (S.D. Tex. 1995) rev'd on other grounds,
sub nom. Toops v. Gulf Coast Marine, Inc., 72 F. 3d 483 (5th Cir. 1996) (mere assertion of new
line of case law insufficient for new trial motion).
46
Newly discovered evidence may not be cumulative or used solely for impeachment. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1, 5, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1956) (newly discovered evidence
may not be merely cumulative).

5th Circuit

Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F. 3d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1995) (newly
discovered evidence in form of nonparty affidavit countering opposition
testimony insufficient because offered primarily to impeach and no
guarantee jury would accept affidavit and reject opposition testimony); see
Trans Mississippi Corp. v. United States, 494 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1974)
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion not granted based on cumulative or
impeaching evidence).

7th Circuit

Wroblewski v. Exchange Ins. Assoc, 273 F.2d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1959)
(evidence to impeach witness* credibility insufficient).

47

Evidence of false testimony may warrant new trial. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum
Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 705 (4th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (abuse of trial court's
discretion to credit witness's testimony after proof was submitted that witness committed perjury,
but court made no attempt to determine extent of perjury).
48

Denial of peremptory challenges. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
548, 555-556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984) (plaintiff prevented from intelligently using
preemptory challenges is not automatically entitled to new trial; plaintiff must show prejudice,
something more than possible removal of juror).
7th Circuit

(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)

Cf. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155-156 (7th Cir. 1988) (order
requiring new jury without exercise of peremptory challenges should not
be granted on eve of trial).
(Re!. 116-12/97
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If the answers cannot be reconciled, the judge may not enter judgment based
on selecting from among inconsistent answers: if the jury has not been discharged,
the court should return the matter to the jury for further consideration;82 if the
jury has been discharged, the court must order a new trial. 83
[Hi]—Verdict Against Clear Weight of Evidence
[A]—Role of Judge
A motion for a new trial may be granted if the trial court determines that the
evidence presented at trial does not support the jury's verdict or the amount of
damages awarded. 84 A trial couri's discretion to grant a new trial when the verdict
is against the clear weight of the evidence includes ordering a new trial outright
or conditioning the order on the verdict winner's refusal to accept a reduction
in the amount of damages {see [g][iiiL below (remittitur)).85
The judge should determine whether the verdict is consistent with the evidence
after considering all of the events of trial. The judge must review the evidence,
view all the evidence as a whole, and weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the evidence. Such a review must be done considering the credibility of the
witnesses, conflicting testimony, and the forcefulness of the evidence. 86 When
i

.

8

* Return for further jury consideration. See Turyna v.' Martam Constr. Co., 83 F.3d 178
(7th Cir. 1996) (one option when jury returns factually inconsistent verdicts is to return matter
to jury; after discharge, only option is new trial).
83
New trial mandatory after discharge. See Turyna v. Martam Constr. Co., 83 F.3d 178, 181
(7th Cir. 1996) (when jury returns factually inconsistent verdicts and is discharged, only option
is new trial).
84

New trial when verdict against weight of evidence. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op,
Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540, 78 S. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953 (1958).
1st Circuit
3d Circuit

7th Circuit

Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. A., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 482-483 (1st
Cir. 1997).
Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R D 237, 242 (D V I 1995)
(court empowered to overturn verdict when against weight of evidence but
power is severely circumscribed).
General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281,
285, 288 (7th Cir. 1982) (new trial properly granted when verdict against
weight of evidence).

85

Discretion to order new trial or condition new trial on remittitur. Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, 516 U.S. —, 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2222, 135 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1996) (citing Moore's;
discretion to grant new trial when verdict is against weight of evidence includes ordering new
trial outright or conditioning the order on the verdict winner's refusal to accept remittitur), t
86

Trial court determines whether verdict consistent with evidence.

(Matthew Bender &. C o . Inc)
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the trial is lengthy and complicated and Involves subject matters outside the
ordinary knowledge of jurors, the court should more closely scrutinize the verdict;
when the subject matter of the trial is simple and easily comprehended by
intelligent laypersons, the court should use less demanding scrutiny.87 However,
the judge is not permitted to merely substitute his or her judgment and
determination of the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury {see
§ 59.54[4][a]).88 A new trial is warranted only if the verdict is so clearly against
the weight of the evidence as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice {see
[B], below)**
3d Circuit

Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242-243 (D.V.I.
1995) (court must review evidence and scrutinize verdict; new trial granted
when record shows verdict results in miscarriage of justice, cries out to
be overturned, or shocks conscience; verdict must have more than
evidentiary basis, verdict must be plausible in light of full evidentiary
record); Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348-1349
(3d Cir. 1991) (against charge that verdict against weight of evidence, new
trial granted when verdict so clearly against weight as to constitute
miscarriage of justice).

8th Circuit

See, e.g., Lincoln Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Singer Co., 549 F.2d 80, 82.(8th
Cir. 1977) (new trial motion requires judge to review all evidence and
exercise independent judgment to determine whether or not verdict against
clear weight of evidence); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 566567 (8th Cir. 1967) (on motion for new trial, court should analyze and
appraise the weight of all the evidence and any other relevant factors).

87

Degree of scrutiny relates to trial's length and complexity* Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
278 F.2d 79, 89-91 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) (level of scrutiny depends on
length and complexity of case).
88
No substitution of judge's judgment. Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917
F. Supp. 112, 116 (D.P.R. 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more easily
supportable is insufficient grounds; verdict must be demonstrably against weight of credible
evidence or result in blatant miscarriage of justice).

1st Circuit

Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 112, 116
(D.P.R. 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more
easily supportable is insufficient grounds; verdict must be demonstrably
against weight of credible evidence or result in blatant miscarriage of
justice).
5th Circuit
Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1985) (jury's verdict
must be against great, not merely greater, weight of evidence).
89 New trial warranted only if verdict is so clearly against weight of evidence as to amount
to manifest miscarriage of justice. Lama v. Borras,f16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (no abuse
of discretion to deny motion unless verdict so clearly against weight of evidence as to amount
to manifest miscarriage of justice
1st Circuit
(Matthew Bender A Co., Inc)

Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. A., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 482-483 (1st
(Re!. 116-12/97
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[B]—Applicable Standard Unclear
The standard applied by trial courts in ruling on a motion to grant a new trial
based on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is
somewhat confused. Although the criteria examined by the judge are similar to
those examined for a motion for judgment as a matter of law (formerly judgments
n.o.v. or directed verdicts), the standard for a new trial is distinct and less
stringent. A court may grant judgment as a matter of law only when a rational
juror could not possibly find for the party with the burden of proof. On such
a motion, all issues of credibility must be resolved in favor of that party. On
a motion for new trial, on the other hand, the judge may make his or her own
judgments as to credibility.90
It should be emphasized, however, that in ruling on a motion for new trial
the court is not simply to substitute its findings for those of the jury. Rather,
the court must be firmly convinced that the verdict is clearly inaccurate. Courts
Cir. 1997); Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (no abuse
of discretion to deny motion unless verdict so clearly against weight of
evidence as to amount to manifest miscarriage of justice).
3d Circuit
Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (D.V.I. 1995)
(standard varies depending on basis for Rule 59 motion).
90
Applicable standard less stringent than judgment as matter of law. See Henry v. Hess
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242-243 (D.V.I. 1995) (when standard for new trial
on ground that judgment against weight of evidence not satisfied, more stringent standard for
judgment n.o.v. or directed verdict cannot be satisfied).
2d Circuit
Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970 (2d Cir. 1987);
Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 950 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(less stringent standard applies to motions for new trials than to motions
for judgment as matter of law); Merrill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 25 F.R.D.
68, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), ajfd, 288 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing cases
addressing distinction).
3d Circuit
See Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242-243
(D.V.I. 1995) (when standard for new trial on ground that judgment against
weight of evidence not satisfied, more stringent standard for judgment
n.o.v. or directed verdict cannot be satisfied).
4th Circuit
See Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 391-393 (4th Cir. 1959) (district
court misapplied "light most favorable" standard, applicable to judgments
as matter of law, to motion for new trial based on excessiveness of verdict).
7th Circuit
General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281,
285 (7th Cir. 1982) (new trial properly granted when verdict against weight
of evidence).
8th Circuit
(Mitlhcw Bender & Co.. Inc.)

Day v. Amax, Inc., 701 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 1983) (new trial standard
less stringent than standard for judgment n.o.v. or directed verdict).
(Rel. 116-12/97
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have broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant a new trial on the
ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see also [A],
above).91 Thus, it is hot necessary to make a showing that the evidence submitted
at trial is legally insufficient to support the verdict to support the grant of a new
trial. Stated differently, a judge may grant a new trial motion even though
substantial evidence supports the verdict.92
However, the mere fact that the evidence is conflicting is insufficient to set
aside the verdict,93 and increasingly serious conflicts in the evidence may require
9
* Broad discretion. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89-91 (3d Cir. 1960), cert,
denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1961).

3d Circuit

Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89-91 (3d Cir. 1960), cert,
denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1961).

10th Circuit

Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1962) (motion
involves discretion that exceeds mere sufficiency of evidence and embraces
all reasons inherent in integrity of judicial system).

92

Substantial evidence no bar to granting new trial. Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st
Cir. 1994) (substantial evidence supporting verdict does not bar grant of new trial).
1st Circuit

Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantial evidence
supporting verdict does not bar grant of new trial).

2d Circuit

Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (new trial
may be granted when substantial evidence supports jury's verdict); Isley
v. Motown Record Corp., 69 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.C. N.Y. 1975) (judge must
grant new trial when verdict is based on false evidence or results in
miscarriage of justice even when supported by substantial evidence that
would preclude directed verdict).

3d Circuit

Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (3d Cir. 1995)
(court's power to overturn judgment on challenge that judgment is against
weight of evidence is severely circumscribed).

4th Circuit

Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874 F.2d 219, 222-223 (4th Cir. 1989) (judge must
grant new trial when verdict against clear weight of evidence, based on
false evidence, or result in miscarriage of justice even when supported by
substantial evidence).

5th Circuit

Hampton v. Magnolia Towing Co., 338 F.2d 303, 306-307 (5th Cir. 1964)
(substantial evidence no bar against granting new trial; court has discretion
to grant new trial when jury verdict is against weight of evidence).

7th Circuit

See General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281,
285, 288 (7th Cir. 1982) (new trial properly granted when verdict against
weight of evidence).

i
93

Conflicting evidence insufficient. Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 F.
Supp. 112, 116 (D.P.Ri 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more easily
supportable is insufficient grounds).
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc )
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greater reluctance on the part of the trial judge to grant a new trial. 94 Some courts
have applied a type of "shocks-the-conscience" test to determine if a new trial
is warranted.95
[g]—Damage Issues
[i]—New Trial When Verdict Entirely Disproportionate to Injury
A motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, governed by Rule 59(a),
will be granted when the amount of the verdict is so unreasonable as to be entirely
disproportionate to the plaintiffs injury.96
1st Circuit

Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 F Supp 112, 116
(D.P.R. 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more
easily supportable is insufficient grounds).

5th Circuit

Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1992)
(conflict in evidence insufficient).

94

More conflict, less likely to grant new trial. See Carroll v. Jaques, 927 F. Supp. 216, 223-224
(D. Tex. 1996) (factor leaning against new trial is degree to which evidence is disputed).
5th Circuit

See Carroll v. Jaques, 927 F. Supp. 216, 223-224 (D. Tex. 1996) (factor
leaning Against new trial is degree to which evidence is disputed).

11th Circuit

Williams v. Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964,973-976 (11th Cir. 1982) (judge should
be increasingly leery of granting new trial (and substituting judge's
determinations for that of jury) when evidence in serious conflict; appellate
court found no great weight of evidence in either direction, holding that
grant of new trial is abuse of discretion

»5 Shocks conscience test. Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (3d
Cir. (1995), quoting Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F. 2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1979) (verdict must
be so unreasonable as to offend conscience of court); Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926
F. 2d 1344, 1349 (3d Cir. 1991) (new trial granted when verdict so clearly against weight of
evidence as to result in miscarriage of justice or when verdict, on record, cries out to be overturned
or shocks conscience).
9

* Verdict entirely disproportionate to injury. Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d
176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
3d Circuit

Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)
(new trial may be granted when verdict is entirely disproportionate to
injury); Zarow-Smith v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 953 F. Supp.
581, 590-591 (D.N.J. 1997) (damages for pecuniary loss without damages
for pain and suffering does not mandate new trial; jury's decision not to
make additional award is reasonable and verdict is not so inadequate as
to be entirely disproportionate to injury).

5th Circuit

Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995).

(Matthew Bender & C o , Inc.)
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[b]—Effect of Motion
On a motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,141
and direct the entry of a new judgment. 142
[c]—Motion to Reopen Distinguished
A Rule 59 motion is distinct from,a motion to reopen to take additional
testimony. A Rule 59 motion is made only after the entry of a judgment, whereas
a motion to reopen is most commonly made before the jury has returned its
verdict, 143 or while the judge has the case under advisement in nonjury actions.
In a motion to reopen, the movant seeks to enter additional testimony into the
record; because no judgment exists, the moving party is not seeking modification
of an existing judgment. Although similar to a Rule 59 or Rule 60(b) motion
based on newly discovered evidence, a motion to reopen does not require that
the evidence be newly discovered or that it could not have been discovered during
the pendency of the trial by a party acting with due diligence {see
§ 59.13[2][c]). 144
6th Circuit

Hager v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 489 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Tenn. 1977),
aff'd without op., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980) (substantial reasons
required to set aside judgment).

141 New testimony and findings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
6th Circuit

Television Reception Corp. v. Dunbar, 426 F.2d 174, 180-181 (6th Cir.
1970) (when affidavit stated that evidence from unavailable witness
contradicted fact found by court, that evidence was not cumulative or
impeaching and would likely lead to new result, abuse of discretion not
to open judgment and take new testimony).

D.C. Circuit

Halper v. Browning, King & Co., 325 F.2d 644,645 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (when
parties misunderstood relative burdens of proof, judgment could be opened
to take new testimony and make new findings and conclusions).

142 N e w judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
9th Circuit

Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of Ca., Ltd., 5 F.R.D. 14, 15-16 (D. Cal.
1945) (court may amend findings and judgment and enter new judgment;
court may not modify and enter judgment for losing party).

i 4 3 N o motion to reopen after jury has been discharged. Langdon v. Taylor, 180 F. 385,
387 (2d Cir. 1910) (motion to reopen after jury is discharged generally requires new trial unless
parties waive their right to jury trial on issues raised by additional proof).
1 4 4 Nature of motion to reopen. See Caracci v. Brother Int'l Sewing Mach. Corp., 222 F. Supp.
769, 777 (E.D. La. 1963), ajfd, 341 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1965) (motion to reopen and take additional
testimony is "cannibalization" of qualities found in Rules 59 and 60).
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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Like a Rule 59 motion, a motion to reopen may be granted or denied in the
district court's discretion. 145 The court must decide the motion in the interest
of fairness and justice. A motion to reopen a bench trial is more likely to be
granted than a motion to reopen a jury trial. 146 Similarly, a motion made during
the early deliberations of a jury is more likely to be granted than a motion made
later in the deliberations, or after the jury has given some indication of its verdict.
[4]—Insufficient Grounds
A new trial may not be granted merely because the losing party may be able
to present a better case in another trial. 147
[5]—New Trial for Less Than AH Parties
Rule 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted to any or all of the parties
to ail action. 148 Thus, in an action with multiple parties, the trial court has the
discretion to grant a new trial only to some but not all of the injured parties
as justice dictates. In such a case, the verdict stands as to the unaffected parties.
It is not error for & court to grant a new trial to defendants found liable while
allowing the verdict to stand as to another defendant found not liable. 149
145

Motion to reopen lies within court's discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331, 91 S. Ct. 795, 28 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1971) (citing Moore's; like motion to
amend pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), motion to reopen to submit additional proof is
addressed to court's sound discretion).
14

* Reopening more likely in court trial. See, e.g., Gile v. Duke, 5 F.2d 952, 953 (9th Cir.
1925) (reopening proper to allow plaintiff to supply certain defects and omission in proof to oppose
defendant's motion to dismiss made at end of plaintiffs case).
147 Presentation of better case.
2d Circuit

Ball v. Interoceanica Corp., 71 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1995), cert, denied,
117 S. Ct. 169 (1996) (quoting Moore's, holding that Rule 59(a) motion
for new trial should not be granted "merely because the losing party can
probably present a better case on another trial"); see Cifarelli v. Village
of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (argument that court should
ignore opposition affidavit because plaintiff not permitted reply fails when
plaintiff knew of defense before seeing affidavit).

14

»S** Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
149 N e w trial for less than all of multiple parties. See Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l
Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 811 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980) (grant of new trial to party
who has received adverse verdict does not require grant of new trial to party who has received
favorable verdict).
1st Circuit
(Matthew Bender & C o , Inc )

Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) (grant of new trial
to one party but not to another).
(Rel 116-12/97
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R156. Commerce, Occupational and Professional Licensing.
R156-55a. Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act Rules.
R156-55a-101. Title.
These rules shall be known as the "Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act Rules".
R156-55a-102. Definitions.
In addition to the definitions in Title 58, Chapters 1 and 55, as defined or used in
these rules:
(1) "Current financial statements" means a statement of financial position/balance
sheet and a statement of earnings/income or profit and loss statement including the
schedules and notes that pertain thereto. These statements are to be prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles presented in a format approved by
the division and covering a period of time ending no earlier than the last tax year end
for the entity submitting the statements.
(2) "Employee", as used in Subsections 58-55-2(6) and 58-55-2(8), means a person
providing labor or services in the construction trades for compensation, whether the
amount of compensation is ascertained on the basis of time, task, piece, commission, or
other unit of measure, who has federal and state taxes withheld and workers' compensation
and unemployment insurance provided by the person's employer.
(3) "Experience," as set forth in Subsections 58-55-5(1)(e)(ii) and R156-55a302a(2)(b), shall mean:
(a) a minimum of four years full-time related experience, two years of which shall
be in a supervisory or managerial position for applicants of contractor classifications
ElOO General Engineering, BlOO General Building, and RlOO Residential and Small Commercial
Building;
(b) a minimum of four years of full-time related experience for applicants of
contractor classifications S280 General Roofing, S290 General Masonry, S280 Steel
Erection, S360 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning, S360 Refrigeration and S370 Fire
Suppression Systems;
(c) a minimum of two years of full-time related experience for applicants of
contractor classifications not listed in Subsections (a) and (b) above.
(4) "Maintenance" means the repair, replacement and refinishing of any component of
an existing structure; but, does not include alteration or modification to the existing
weight-bearing structural components.
(5) "Mechanical", as used in Subsections 58-55-2(11) and 58-55-2(23) means the work
which may be performed by a S350 HVAC Contractor under Subsection R156-55a-301(3).
(6) "Owners equity" means the difference obtained by subtracting total liabilities
from total assets.
(7) "Personal property" means, as it relates to Title 58, Chapter 56, factory built
housing and modular construction, a structure which is titled by the Motor Vehicles
Division, state of Utah, and taxed as personal property.
(8) "Pro Forma" means, as applied to an income statement, an income statement using
best estimates of the revenues, expenses and other entries on the statement. The format
for the statement shall be that generally accepted for such a statement and shall cover a
future period of not less than one year.
(9) "Total assets" means the total of current assets, plant and equipment, and any
other tangible assets listed on the balance sheet. It does not include "good will" or
other intangible assets.
(10) "Unprofessional conduct" defined in Title 58, Chapters 1 and 55, is further
defined in accordance with Subsection 58-1-203(5) to include:
(a) failure by a licensee to notify the division with respect to any matter for
which notification is required under these rules or Title 58, Chapter 55, the Construction
Trades Licensing Act, including the loss of insurance coverage or change in qualifier.
Such failure shall be considered by the division and the board as grounds for immediate
suspension of the contractors license.
(11) "Working capital" means the difference obtained by subtracting current
liabilities from current assets.
R156-55a-103. Authority.
These rules are adopted by the division under the authority of Subsection 58-1106(1) to enable the division to administer Title 58, Chapter 55.
R156-55a-104. Organization - Relationship to Rule R156-1.
The organization of this rule and its relationship to Rule R156-1 is as described in
Section R156-1-107.
R156-55a-301. License Classifications - Scope of Practice.
(1) Licenses shall be issued in the license classifications or subclassifications
set forth in Subsection (2) of this section. A person licensed in any primary
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classification shall be qualiried and permitted to perform the work defined under any
license subclassification of that primary classification, A person licensed only in a
subclassification shall be qualified and permitted to perform the work defined under that
subclassification only. A specialty contractor may perform work in crafts or trades other
than those in which he is licensed if they are clearly incidental to the performance of
his licensed craft or trade.
(2) Licenses shall be issued in the following primary classifications and
subclassifications:
TABLE
Primary
Classification
Number

Subclassification
Number

E100
B100
R100
R101

R200
S200
S201
S210
S211
S212
S213
S214
S215
S216
S220
S221
S230
S231
S240
S250
S260
S261
S262
S270

Title
General Engineering
Contractor
General Building
Contractor
Residential and Small
Commercial Contractor
Residential and
Small Commercial
Non-Structural
Remodeling and
Repair
Factory Built Housing
Set-Up Contractor
General Electrical
Contractor
Residential
Electrical
Contractor
General Plumbing
Contractor
Boiler Installation
Contractor
Irrigation
Sprinkling
Contractor
Industrial Piping
Contractor
Water Conditioning
Equipment Contractor
Solar Energy
Systems Contractor
Residential Sewer
Connection and Septic
Tank Contractor
Carpentry Contractor
Cabinet and Millwork
Installation
Contractor
Metal and Vinyl Siding
Contractor
Raingutter
Installation
Contractor
Glass and Glazing
Contractor
Insulation Contractor
General Concrete
Contractor
Concrete Form
Setting and Shoring
Contractor
Gunnite and Pressure
Grouting Contractor
General Drywall,

hnoQ

S271
S272

S273

S280
S281
S282
S283
S284
S285
S290
S291
S292
S293
S300
S310
S320
S321
S322
S323
S330
S340
S350
S351
S352
S353
S360
S370
S380
S390
S400
S410
S420

Stucco and Plastering
Contractor
Plastering and Stucco
Contractor
Ceiling Grid
Systems, Ceiling
Tile and
Panel Systems
Contractor
Light-weight Metal
and Non-bearing Wall
Partitions
Contractor
General Roofing
Contractor
Single Ply and
Specialty Coating
Contractor
Build-up Roofing
Contractor
Shingle and Shake
Roofing Contractor
Tile Roofing
Contractor
Metal Roofing
Contractor
General Masonry
Contractor
Stone Masonry
Contractor
Terrazzo Contractor
Marble, Tile and
Ceramic Contractor
General Painting
Contractor
Excavation and Grading
Contractor
Steel Erection
Contractor
Steel Reinforcing
Contractor
Metal Building
Erection Contractor
Structural Stud
Erection Contractor
Landscaping Contractor
Sheet Metal Contractor
HVAC Contractor
Refrigerated Air
Conditioning
Contractor
Evaporative Cooling
Contractor
Warm Air Heating
Contractor
Refrigeration
Contractor
Fire Supression
Systems Contractor
Swimming Pool and Spa
Contractor
Sewer and Water
Pipeline Contractor
Asphalt Paving
Contractor
Pipeline and Conduit
Contractor
General Fencing and
Guardrail Contractor

0090

S421
S430
S440
S441
S450
S460
S470
S480

Residential Fencing
Contractor
Metal Firebox and Fuel
Burning Stove
Installer
Sign Installation
Contractor
Non Electrical
Outdoor Advertising
Sign Contractor
Mechanical Insulation
Contractor
Wrecking and
Demolition Contractor
Petroleum System
Contractor
Piers and Foundations
Contractor

(3) The license classifications and subclassifications are defined as follows:
E100 - General Engineering Contractor. A General Engineering contractor is a
contractor licensed to perform work as defined in Subsection 58-55-2(12).
B100 - General Building Contractor. A General Building contractor is a contractor
licensed to perform work as defined in Subsection 58-55-2(11).
R100 - Residential and Small Commercial Contractor. A Residential and Small
Commercial contractor is a contractor licensed to perform work as defined in Subsection
58-55-2(23).
R101 - Residential and Small Commercial Non Structural Remodeling and Repair.
Remodeling and repair to any existing structure built for support, shelter and enclosure
of persons, animals, chattels or movable property of any kind with the restriction that no
change is made to the bearing portions of the existing structure, including footings,
foundation and weight bearing walls; and the entire project is less than $1,000,000 in
total cost.
R200 - Factory Built Housing Set Up Contractor. Set up or installation of
manufactured housing on a temporary or permanent basis. The scope of the work permitted
under this classification includes placement of the manufactured housing on a permanent or
temporary foundation, securing the units together if required, securing the manufactured
housing to the foundation, and connection of the utilities to the manufactured housing
unit. Work excluded from this classification includes site preparation or finishing,
construction of a permanent foundation and construction of utility services to the near
proximity of the manufactured housing unit from which they are connected to the unit.
S200 - General Electrical Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and/or
installation of generators, transformers, conduits, raceways, panels, switch gear,
electrical wiresr fixtures, appliances, or apparatus which utilizes electrical energy.
S201_- Residential Electrical Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and/or
installation of services, disconnecting means, grounding devices, panels, conductors, load
centers, lighting and plug circuits, appliances and fixtures in any residential unit,
normally requiring non-metallic sheathed cable, including multiple units up to and
including five-plex, but excluding any work generally recognized in the industry as
commercial or industrial.
5210 - General Plumbing Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of material
and fixtures to create and maintain sanitary conditions in buildings, by providing a
permanent means for a supply of safe and pure water, a means for the timely and complete
removal from the premises of all used or contaminated water, fluid and semi-fluid organic
wastes and other impurities incidental to life and the occupation of such premises, and
provision of a safe and adequate supply of gases for lighting, heating, and industrial
purposes. Work permitted under this classification shall include the furnishing of
materials, fixtures and labor to extend service from a building out to the main water,
sewer or gas pipeline.
5211 - Boiler Installation Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of fire-tube
and water-tube power boilers and hot water heating boilers, including all fittings and
piping, valves, gauges, pumps, radiators, converters, fuel oil tanks, fuel lines, chimney
flues, heat insulation and all other devices, apparatus, and equipment related thereto.
5212 - Irrigation Sprinkling Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and/or installation
of water distribution system for artificial watering or irrigation.
5213 - Industrial Piping Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of pipes and
piping for the conveyance or transmission of steam, gases, chemicals, and other substances
including excavating, trenching, and back-filling related to such work.
5214 - Water Conditioning Equipment Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of
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water conditioning equipment, and only such pipe and fittings *»s are necessary for
connecting the water conditioning equipment to the water supply system within the
premises.
5215 - Solar Energy Systems Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of solar
energy systems.
5216 - Residential Sewer Connection and Septic Tank Contractor. Construction of
residential sewer lines including connection to the public sewer line, and excavation and
grading related thereto. Excavation, installation and grading of residential septic tanks
and their drainage.
5220 - Carpentry Contractor. Fabrication for structural and finish purposes in a
structure or building using wood and wood products as is by custom and usage accepted in
the building industry as carpentry.
5221 - Cabinet and Millwork Installation Contractor. On-site construction and/or
installation of milled wood products.
5230 - Metal and Vinyl Siding Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and/or
installation of wood, aluminum, steel or vinyl sidings.
5231 - Raingutter Installation Contractor. On-site fabrication and/or installation
of raingutters and drains, roof flashings, gravel stops and metal ridges.
S240 - Glass and Glazing Contractor. Fabrication, construction, installation,
and/or removal of all types and sizes of glass, mirrors, substitutes for glass, glassholding members, frames, hardware, and other incidental related work.
S250 - Insulation Contractor. Installation of any insulating media in buildings and
structures for the sole purpose of temperature or sound control.
5260 - General Concrete Contractor. Fabrication, construction, mixing, batching,
and/or installation of concrete and related concrete products along with the placing and
setting of screeds for pavement for flatwork, the construction of forms, placing and
erection of steel bars for reinforcing and application of plaster and other cement-related
products.
5261 - Concrete Form Setting and Shoring Contractor. Fabrication, construction,
and/or installation of forms and shoring material; but, does not include the placement of
concrete, finishing of concrete or embedded items such as metal reinforcement bars or
mesh.
5262 - Gunnite and Pressure Grouting Contractor. Installation of a concrete product
either injected or sprayed under pressure.
5270 - General Drywall, Stucco and Plastering Contractor. Fabrication,
construction, and/or installation of drywall, gypsum, wallboard panels and assemblies.
Preparation of surfaces for suitable painting or finishing. Installation of light-weight
metal, non-bearing wall partitions, ceiling grid systems, and ceiling tile or panel
systems.
5271 - Plastering and Stucco Contractor. Application to surfaces of coatings made
of stucco and plaster, including the preparation of the surface and the provision of a
base.
5272 - Ceiling Grid Systems, Ceiling Tile and Panel Systems Contractor. Fabrication
and/or installation of wood, mineral, fiber, and other types of ceiling tile and panels
and the grid systems required for placement.
5273 - Light-weight Metal and Non-bearing Wall Partitions Contractor. Fabrication
and/or installation of light-weight metal and other non-bearing wall partitions.
5280 - General Roofing Contractor. Application and/or installation of asphalt,
pitch, tar, felt, flax, shakes, shingles, roof tile, slate, and any other material or
materials, or any combination of any thereof which use and custom has established as
usable for, or which are now used as, water-proof, weatherproof, or watertight seal or
membranes for roofs and surfaces; and roof conversion.
5281 - Single Ply and Specialty Coating Contractor. Application of solutions of
rubber, latex, or other materials or single-ply material to surfaces to prevent, hold,
keep, and stop water, other liquids, derivatives, compounds, and solids from penetrating
and passing such materials thereby gaining access to material or space beyond such
waterproofing.
5282 - Build-up Roofing Contractor. Application of solutions of rubber, latex,
asphalt, pitch, tar, or other materials in conjunction with the application of layers,
felt, or other material to a roof or other surface.
5283 - Shingle and Shake Roofing Contractor. Application of shingles and shakes
made of wood or any other material.
5284 - Tile Roofing Contractor. Application or installation of tile roofs including
under layment material and sealing and reinforcement of weight bearing roof structures for
the purpose of supporting the weight of the tile.
5285 - Metal Roofing Contractor. On-site fabrication and/or application of metal
roofing materials.
S290 - General Masonry Contractor. Construction by cutting, and/or laying of all of
the following brick, block, or forms: architectural, industrial, and refractory brick, all
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brick substitutes, clay and concrete blocks, terracotta, thin set or structural quarry
tile, glazed structural tile, gypsum tile, glass block, clay tile, copings, natural stone,
plastic refractories, and castables and any incidental works as required in construction
of the masonry work.
5291 — Stone Masonry Contractor. Construction using natural or artificial stone,
either rough or cut and dressed, laid at random, with or without mortar.
5292 - Terrazzo Contractor. Construction by fabrication, grinding, and polishing of
terrazzo by the setting of chips of marble, stone, or other material in an irregular
pattern with the use of cement, polyester, epoxy or other common binders.
5293 - Marble, Tile and Ceramic Contractor. Preparation, fabrication, construction,
and installation of artificial marble, burned clay tile, ceramic, encaustic, faience,
quarry, semi-vitreous, and other tile, excluding hollow or structural partition tile.
S300 - General Painting Contractor. Preparation of surface and the application of
all paints, varnishes, shellacs, stains, waxes and other coatings or pigments by the use
of brushes, spray or rollers.
S310 - Excavation and Grading Contractor. Moving of the earth's surface or placing
earthen materials on the earth's surface, by use of hand or power machinery and tools,
including explosives, in any operation of cut, fill, excavation, grading, trenching,
backfilling, or combination thereof as they are generally practiced in the construction
trade.
5320 - Steel Erection Contractor. Construction by fabrication, placing, and tying
or welding of steel reinforcing bars or erecting structural steel shapes, plates of any
profile, perimeter or cross-section that are used to reinforce concrete or as structural
members, including riveting, welding, and rigging.
5321 - Steel Reinforcing Contractor. Fabricating, placing, tying, or mechanically
welding of reinforcing bars of any profile that are used to reinforce concrete buildings
or structures.
5322 - Metal Building Erection Contractor. Erection of pre-fabricated metal
structures including concrete foundation and footings, grading, and surface preparation.
5323 - Structural Stud Erection Contractor. Fabrication and installation of metal
structural studs and bearing walls.
S330 - Landscaping Contractor. Grading and preparing land for architectural,
horticultural, and the decorative treatment, arrangement, and planting or gardens, lawns,
shrubs, vines, bushes, trees, and other decorative vegetation. Construction of pools,
tanks, fountains, hot and green houses, retaining walls, patio areas when they are an
incidental part of the prime contract, fences, walks, garden lighting of 50 volts or less,
and sprinkler systems.
S340 - Sheet Metal Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and installation of air
handling and ventilating systems. All architectural sheet metal such as cornices,
marquees, metal soffits, gutters, flashings, and skylights and skydomes including both
plastic and fiberglass.
5350 - HVAC Contractor. Fabrication and installation of complete warm air heating
and air conditioning systems, and complete ventilating systems.
5351 * Refrigerated Air Conditioning Contractor. Fabrication and installation of
air conditioning ventilating systems to control air temperatures below 50 degrees.
5352 - Evaporative Cooling Contractor. Fabrication and installation of devices,
machinery, and units to cool the air temperature employing evaporation of liquid.
5353 - Warm Air Heating Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and installation of such
sheet metal, gas piping, and furnace equipment as necessary for a complete warm air
heating and ventilating system.
S360 - Refrigeration Contractor. Construction and/or installation of refrigeration
equipment including, but not limited to, built-in refrigerators, refrigerated rooms,
insulated refrigerated spaces and equipment related thereto; but, the scope of permitted
work does not include the installation of gas fuel or electric power services other than
connection of electrical devices to a junction box provided for that device and electrical
control circuitry not exceeding 50 volts.
S370 - Fire Supression Systems Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and installation of
fire protection systems using water, steam, gas, or chemicals. When a potable sanitary
water supply system is used as the source of supply, connection to the water system must
be accomplished by a licensed journeyman plumber.
S380 - Swimming Pool and Spa Contractor. Onsight fabrication, construction and
installation of swimming pools, spas, and tubs.
S390 - Sewer and Water Pipeline Contractor. Construction of sewer lines, sewage
disposal and sewage drain facilities including excavation and grading with respect
thereto, and the construction of sewage disposal plants and appurtenances thereto.
S400 - Asphalt Paving Contractor. Construction of asphalt highways, roadways,
driveways, parking lots or other asphalt surfaces including excavation, grading,
compacting and laying of fill or base-related thereto.
S410 - Pipeline and Conduit Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and installation
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of pipes for the conveyance and transmission from one station to another of such products
as water, steam, gases, chemicals, or sturries. Included are the excavation, grading, and
backfilling necessary for construction of the system.
5420 - General Fencing and Guardrail Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and
installation of fences, guardrails, and barriers.
5421 - Residential Fencing Contractor. Fabrication and installation of wire, metal
or wood residential fencing up to and including a height of six feet.
S430 - Metal Firebox and Fuel Burning Stove Installer. Fabrication, construction,
and installation of metal fireboxes, fireplaces, and wood or coal-burning stoves.
5440 - Sign Installation Contractor. Installation of signs and graphic displays
which require installation permits or permission as issued by state or local governmental
jurisdictions. Signs and graphic displays shall include signs of all types, both lighted
and unlighted, permanent highway marker signs, illuminated awnings, electronic message
centers, sculptures or graphic representations including logos and trademarks intended to
identify or advertise the user or his product, building trim or lighting with neon or
decorative fixtures, or any other animated, moving or stationary device used for
advertising or identification purposes. Signs and graphic displays must be fabricated,
installed and erected in accordance with professionally engineered specifications and
wiring in accordance with the National Electrical Code.
5441 - Non Electrical Outdoor Advertising Sign Contractor. Installation of signs
and graphic displays which require installation permits or permission as issued by state
and local governmental jurisdictions. Signs and graphics shall include outdoor
advertising signs which do not have electrical lighting or other electrical requirements,
and in accordance with professionally engineered specifications.
S450 - Mechanical Insulation Contractor. Fabrication, application and installation
of insulation materials to pipes, ducts and conduits.
S460 - Wrecking and Demolition Contractor. The raising, cribbing, underpinning,
moving, and removal of building and structures so that alterations, additions, repairs,
and new sub-structures may be built.
S470 - Petroleum Systems Contractor. Installation of above and below ground
petroleum and petro-chemical storage tanks, piping, dispensing equipment, monitoring
equipment and associated petroleum and petro-chemical equipment including excavation,
backfilling, concrete and asphalt.
S480 - Piers and Foundations Contractor. The excavation, drilling, compacting,
pumping, sealing and other work necessary to construct, alter or repair piers, piles,
footings and foundations placed in the earth's subsurface to prevent structural settling
and to provide an adequate capacity to sustain or transmit the structural load to the soil
or rock below.
R156-55a-302a. Qualifications for Licensure - Examinations.
(1) The division, in collaboration with the board, shall adopt a competent
examination designed to determine whether an applicant for a contractors license meets the
minimum standard necessary for a person to practice as a contractor in the particular
primary classification or subclassification in which licensure is requested.
(2) An applicant for a contractors license shall pass the following examinations as
a condition precedent to licensure as a contractor:
(a) the classification specific examination adopted by the division in accordance
with Subsection (1) of this section; and
(b) the Utah Contractor Law Examination.
(3) The passing score for each examination required for licensure is 70%.
(4) The application for examination, conduct of the examination, content of the
examination, scoring of the examination and notification of examination results shall be
in accordance with current publications of the division.
R156-55a-302b. Qualifications for Licensure - Experience Requirements.
(1) Each applicant for a contractors license shall bear the burden and
responsibility for presenting to the division and the board satisfactory evidence that the
applicant or the applicant's qualifier has that knowledge and experience in the work
required of a contractor to provide reasonable assurance the applicant can engage
successfully in business as a contractor.
(2) The division and board shall consider all evidence presented including:
(a) construction related education as approved by the division:
(i) in contractor work;
(ii) in the conduct of business;
(b) experience in the construction crafts or trades relating to the classification
or subclassification in which licensure is sought:
(i) type and length of experience;
(A) as a laborer, craftsman or tradesman;
(B) as a supervisor or manager;
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